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Justice Kennedy’s “Gay Agenda”: Romer, Lawrence, and
the Struggle for Marriage Equality
Lawrence C. Levine*
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Kennedy, in his near quarter century on the United States Supreme
Court, authored the two most important decisions positively affecting the lives of
1
2
gays and lesbians in the United States: Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas.
These two decisions were monumental in bringing gays and lesbians in the
3
United States into the realm of constitutional protection. Rightfully, Justice
Kennedy has been lauded for his thoughtful and sensitive gay-friendly
4
jurisprudence.
Justice Kennedy’s key gay-rights decisions have been subjected to
substantial criticism even by those favoring gay and lesbian rights, however.
There are ambiguities in both Romer and Lawrence that have permitted lower
5
courts to interpret these decisions extremely narrowly. Further, because of the
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I had the opportunity to present
a version of this Article at a McGeorge Law Review-sponsored symposium on April 6, 2012. I benefited greatly
from hearing the presentations of the authors of the pieces that accompany this Article in this symposium issue,
as well as from comments I received from several of participants about my piece in particular. I especially wish
to thank Professors Arthur Leonard, Amy Ronner, and John Sims for their comments on earlier drafts of this
Article. I want to thank my McGeorge research assistants, David Bass and Danielle Lenth for their invaluable
assistance with this project.
As will become apparent in this Article, I neither believe that Justice Kennedy has joined some “gay
agenda,” nor do I believe that any such thing exists. But Justice Scalia accused Justice Kennedy of doing just
this—joining the “homosexual agenda”—in his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
1. See 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The Court had decided other important gay and lesbian-focused decisions
that have had a negative impact, the most notable being Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2. See 539 U.S. 558. Throughout this Article, I largely (though not exclusively) use the term “gay and
lesbian” although I am aware of the narrowness of the term. I do this because this language more closely tracks
the language used by the U.S. Supreme Court in the opinions I reference above and for ease of expression. I am
well aware of the impact of these decisions on, for example, bisexuals. See, e.g., Michael Boucai, Sexual
Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415 (2012).
3. See Romer, 517 U.S. 620; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
4. The journalist Jeffrey Toobin, for example, noted that Justice Kennedy’s “opinions in the Colorado
and Texas cases have made him the Court’s most visible defender of gay rights . . . .” Jeffrey Toobin, Swing
Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER,
Sept. 12, 2005, at 51; see also FRANK J. COLLUCI: JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND
NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY 123–26 (2009); HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE
ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY 93–94 (2009).
5. See Clifford J. Rosky, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage Law, 53 ARIZ.
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uncertainties raised in those opinions, the Supreme Court will be free to interpret
both quite restrictively in subsequent cases while claiming adherence to stare
decisis. Only time will tell how effective Justice Kennedy’s opinions will be in
protecting the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians.
The uncertainty about the reach and meaning of both Romer and Lawrence
has become particularly problematic in the continuing debate about the
constitutionality of the heterosexual marriage monopoly that currently exists in
6
most states. Courts have interpreted Romer and Lawrence in dramatically
7
different ways. Until the Supreme Court more clearly defines the reach of those
decisions, this disagreement will continue.
In this Article, I praise Justice Kennedy’s sensitivity and vision when it
comes to gay and lesbian rights as no Supreme Court Justice has done more to
provide constitutional protection to this community. That said, I also identify
some of the problems created by the ambiguous nature of his opinions.
The United States Supreme Court will likely weigh in soon on the ongoing
8
debate about the constitutionality of banning gays and lesbians from marriage.
Many believe that Justice Kennedy will be the swing vote on this important
9
issue. For these reasons, I endeavor, with no small amount of trepidation, to
prognosticate on Justice Kennedy’s likely approach to the issue based on his
existing decisions.

L. REV. 913, 960–83 (2011); see also J. Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEY J. OF CRIM. L.
41, 57–60 (2011).
6. Before the November 2012 election, the institution of marriage was restricted to heterosexuals in
forty-four states. Only Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Iowa, Connecticut, New York, Vermont, and the
District of Columbia permitted people of the same sex to wed. RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES
WORLDWIDE, RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE UNITED STATES, LAMBDA LEGAL (Jan. 12, 2012),
available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/fs_recognition-of-same-sexcouples-worldwide_3.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). After the November 2012 election, the
voters in three states—Maine, Maryland, and Washington—provided gays and lesbians access to the institution
of marriage. Edith Honan, Maryland, Maine, Washington Approve Gay Marriage, REUTERS (Nov. 7,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usa-campaign-gaymarriage-idUSBRE8A60MG20121107
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
7. Compare, e.g., Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006), with Perry v.
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
8. Perry, 671 F.3d 1052, cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 WL 3134429
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2012). The Court may not reach the substantive issues as the Justices specifically raised the issue
of standing. Id. Despite the different case name on appeal, this Article refers to “Perry v. Brown” rather than
“Hollingsworth v. Perry,” due to the notoriety of the former case name.
9. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Justice Kennedy and the Ideal of Equality, 28 PAC. L.J. 515, 516 (1997)
(noting “as Kennedy goes, so goes the Court”). Kennedy is often seen as the Court’s swing vote on many
important legal issues. If anything, the perception of Justice Kennedy as the deciding vote has only gotten
stronger. See Ilya Shapiro, A Faint Hearted Libertarian at Best: The Sweet Mystery of Justice Anthony Kennedy
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 333, 333 (2009) (book review) (“Anyone who has even a passing interest in the
Supreme Court knows that, with the departure of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Anthony Kennedy
became the Court’s one and only swing Justice.”).

2
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The Ninth Circuit’s 2012 opinion in Perry v. Brown presents the Supreme
Court the opportunity to jump into the marriage-equality debate in this current
term. In Perry, the Ninth Circuit invalidated on federal constitutional grounds
California’s Proposition 8, which had overturned California law permitting gays
11
and lesbians equal access to marriage. As explained below, the Supreme Court
review of Perry enables the Court to enter into the marriage-equality discussion
without having to proclaim a far-reaching constitutional right to marriage for
12
gays and lesbians while giving greater guidance on the reach of Romer.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court will ultimately have to confront the more
difficult issue of whether the Constitution requires all states to permit gays and
lesbians equal access to the institution of marriage.
Part II of this Article examines Romer, while Part III analyzes Lawrence,
noting each opinion’s positive attributes along with its shortcomings. Part IV
looks at the recent Perry decision, as this case striking down California’s
Proposition 8 may be the vehicle enabling the Court to enter the current
marriage-equality debate. Part V looks at how the Romer and Lawrence decisions
may influence the legal struggle for marriage equality. Finally, in Part VI, I turn
to what those decisions suggest regarding Justice Kennedy’s likely perspective
on the marriage-equality issue, concluding that neither Romer nor Lawrence
foretell how Justice Kennedy will rule on a case presenting the issue. Justice
Kennedy’s decisions conferring constitutional protection upon gays and lesbians,
along with the potential that his due process liberty concept encompasses broadly
defined relational choice, makes his support for marriage equality possible and
maybe even probable. Time will tell.

10. 671 F.3d 1052. As this Article goes to press, the United States Supreme Court has recently granted a
petition for certiorari in this case under the name Hollingsworth v. Perry. 2012 WL 3134429.
11. 671 F.3d at 1096. In this Article, I intentionally use primarily the term “marriage equality” in lieu of
“same-sex marriage” or “gay marriage” for two reasons. First, I use “marriage equality” because it is the best
way to highlight that this is a struggle for equal treatment in the marriage context and not about an effort to
create some new and foreign institution. Second, in the context of this Article, marriage equality articulates the
issue in the way that is likely most appealing to Justice Kennedy’s constitutional approach as it puts “tolerance,
dignity, and responsibility,” over difference and group-based identity. KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 16.
12. Other marriage-equality issues will be heard by the Court other than those discussed in this Article.
For example, during this term, the Supreme Court will consider the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006), in Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, No. 12-307, 2012 WL 4009654 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012). Windsor raises the issue of
whether the federal government may deprive federal benefits to those who are legally married under the law of
their state. Id. While these cases do not require the Court to decide whether states must permit gays and lesbians
access to marriage, they invite the Court to consider if there are acceptable justifications for treating some legal
marriages differently than other legal marriages based on the sex and sexual orientation of the participants.
Although a different issue, a Supreme Court decision upholding DOMA in this context would surely not bode
well for the legal struggle for marriage equality.

3
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II. ROMER V. EVANS—JUSTICE KENNEDY REFUSES TO ALLOW GAYS AND
13
LESBIANS TO BE “A STRANGER TO THE LAW”
In Romer v. Evans, Justice Kennedy, writing for the six-Justice majority,
determined that Colorado’s Amendment 2 violated the federal Constitution’s
14
Equal Protection Clause. A majority of Colorado’s voters had approved
Amendment 2, which sought to overturn existing state and local antidiscrimination protections afforded to Colorado’s gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
15
(such as bans on job or housing discrimination based on sexual orientation). It
also sought to prohibit the state or state entities from enacting any such
16
protections in the future absent another statewide initiative. Had the Court
decided the case differently, the impact would have been an enormous setback
for gay and lesbian rights; in many jurisdictions, a simple majority vote of the
electorate would have successfully erased anti-discrimination protections for
gays and lesbians.
17
There is much to praise in Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Justice Kennedy
18
begins powerfully by citing Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, in
which Justice Harlan stated that the Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates
19
classes among citizens.” By referring to the dissent of one of the most maligned
13. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). For an interesting account of Romer v. Evans, see generally LISA KEEN &
SUZANNE BETH GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL (2000).
14. 517 U.S. at 635.
15. Id. at 624–25.
16. Id. Amendment 2 stated:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of
Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any
minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the
Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id. at 624. There was some uncertainty about whether Amendment 2 would also affect laws of general
application as they applied to gay, lesbian, and bisexual residents of Colorado. For example, it was unclear
whether a lesbian who called the fire department due to her home being aflame could sue if the fire department
refused to answer her call due to her sexual orientation. Justice Kennedy raised but did not resolve the question.
Id. at 628. Justice Scalia in the dissent contended that Amendment 2 did not reach laws of general application.
Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority found Amendment 2 to be unconstitutional even if its reach
extended only to laws specifically protecting gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from discrimination based on their
sexual orientation. Id. at 633.
17. Although, as discussed below, there has been ample criticism of the legal foundations for the
opinion, Professor Akil Reed Amar praises the opinion as “an elegant blending of legal formalism and legal
realism at their best.” Amar, supra note 9, at 530.
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Justice Harlan’s
dissent in Plessy has been lauded by many for not following the despicable “separate but equal” approach to the
treatment of African-Americans. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan’s Dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 963–64 (1992). This remains
true notwithstanding his highly offensive comments about Chinese immigrants. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan,

4

01_LEVINE_VER_01_6-18-12_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

7/22/2013 2:31 PM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
discrimination cases in United States history, Justice Kennedy signals the
importance of the issue before the Court and firmly places the struggle for gays
20
and lesbians into the civil rights framework.
In strong and sympathetic language, Justice Kennedy lays out the pernicious
impact of Amendment 2, which, as he explains, “withdraws from homosexuals,
but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by
21
discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies.” Further
and importantly, Justice Kennedy debunks the common refrain that anti22
discrimination policies for gays and lesbians confer upon them “special rights.”
As Justice Kennedy pointedly explains:
[W]e cannot accept the view that Amendment 2’s prohibition on specific
legal protections does no more than deprive homosexuals of special
rights. To the contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability upon
those persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that
others enjoy or may seek without constraint. . . . We find nothing special
in the protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken
for granted by most people either because they already have them or do
not need them; these are protections against the exclusion from an almost
limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary
23
civic life in a free society.
Throughout the brief opinion, Justice Kennedy notes the far-reaching nature
24
of Amendment 2, which he views as “unprecedented in our jurisprudence” and
25
not “within our constitutional tradition” because it refers to a group identified
by a single trait and deprives them of “the right to seek specific protection from
26
the law.”
In Romer, Justice Kennedy does not specifically determine the appropriate
level of scrutiny to apply to the class at hand—gays and lesbians—because he
determines that in light of Amendment 2’s “broad and undifferentiated disability
J., dissenting) (stating that the “Chinaman” belongs to a “race so different from our own that we do not permit
those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States”).
20. To this end, Romer is not just about unequal treatment of gays and lesbians but more broadly about
discrimination of politically unpopular groups. See KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 108.
21. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627. Justice Kennedy uses the term “gay and lesbian” occasionally in the opinion
though he used the term “homosexuals” more often throughout the opinion. Justice Souter was the first Justice
to employ “gay and lesbian” in a Supreme Court majority in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
22. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
23. Id. Justice Scalia, for the three dissenters, adopts the “special rights” trope, noting that all
Amendment 2 does is to prevent homosexuals from obtaining “preferential treatment without amending the
State Constitution.” Id. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
24. Id. at 632.
25. Id. at 633.
26. Id. at 632.
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on a single named group” and because of its “sheer breadth,” Amendment 2
27
“lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.” In a short paragraph,
Justice Kennedy dismisses the state’s asserted bases for Amendment 2 (to not
interfere with rights of association and to conserve resources to fight
discrimination against other groups) by again noting that the “breadth of the
amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that [it is]
28
impossible to credit them.” In so doing, Justice Kennedy makes clear that at
least in the context of laws limiting the rights of gays and lesbians, the state’s
29
asserted bases to justify a law will not be taken at face value.
Justice Kennedy concludes that Amendment 2 must have been the result of
30
animus toward gays and lesbians, which cannot serve as a rational basis. He
ends with the oft-quoted and elegantly worded sentence: “A State cannot deem a
31
class of citizens a stranger to its law.”
Justice Kennedy’s opinion reaches the important result of guarding gays and
lesbians from majoritarian deprivation of anti-discrimination protection but does
so largely through a creative and unusual cobbling together of case precedent to
32
reach its ultimate result. Thus, Justice Scalia, in his biting dissent (which is
lengthier than the majority opinion), has some basis for his claim that the opinion
33
is “long on emotive utterance and so short on relevant legal citation.” Part of
Justice Kennedy’s challenge in finding authority directly on point is that the U.S.
Supreme Court majority approached the issue differently than the Colorado
34
Supreme Court did in striking down Amendment 2. The Colorado Supreme
Court invalidated Amendment 2 because it infringed on the fundamental right of
35
gays and lesbians to participate in the political process. Justice Kennedy, to
27. Id.
28. Id. at 635. Justice Kennedy’s application of rational basis does not accept the state’s asserted bases
for Amendment 2 at face value. See id. Because he engaged in a more searching form of rational basis review in
Romer, some scholars have determined that a heightened form of rational basis applies in cases dealing with
discrimination against gays and lesbians. This has led to academic assertions that there may now be two forms
of rational basis review: vanilla rational basis and rational basis with a bite. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New
Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 759–63 (2011).
29. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (dismissing the state’s justification that Amendment 2 “does no more
than deprive homosexuals of a special right”).
30. Id. at 632. Justice Scalia lambasts the majority for failing to cite Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld
the criminalization of same-sex sodomy based on the legislature’s moral disapproval. Id. at 640–42 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). With Justice Kennedy’s determination that majoritarian dislike of a group is not a rational basis,
Justice Scalia surmises correctly that Bowers cannot be long for this world. See id.
31. Id. at 625.
32. See id. at 631–36. Justice Kennedy has support for his position that animus against a disfavored
group is not a rational basis, however. Id. at 634 (citing Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 5287 (1973)).
33. Id. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See id. at 631–36 (employing an equal protection, rather than due process, analysis to reach the
holding).
35. Id. at 630–31. As the Colorado court explained: “the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution protects the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process, and that any legislation
or state constitutional amendment which infringes on this right by ‘fencing out’ an independently identifiable

6
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avoid getting drawn into the morass of political-participation cases, opted for a
36
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection analysis instead.
Robust debate continues over whether laws treating gays and lesbians
37
unequally should be subjected to some sort of heightened scrutiny. Because
Justice Kennedy determines that Amendment 2 is not rationally related to the
State’s alleged justifications, some interpret Romer as determining that gays and
38
lesbians as a class should not be subject to any sort of heightened scrutiny. This
is not a fair read of the majority opinion, as Justice Kennedy never discussed the
39
issue of heightened scrutiny for gays and lesbians. Rather, he determined that
Amendment 2 failed even a rational basis analysis, as it did not bear “a rational
40
relation to some legitimate end.” Thus, the issue of what level of scrutiny
applies to gay and lesbians remains unresolved.
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer is so angry and acerbic that it is likely
41
counterproductive. Justice Kennedy’s determination that animus toward gays
and lesbians was the motivating factor behind Amendment 2 may well have been
42
buttressed by the harshness of the Scalia dissent. In a case concerned with antigay animus, Justice Scalia’s language could not help but drive a compassionate
person such as Justice Kennedy to better understand the unacceptable
43
mistreatment of gays and lesbians in American society. Thus, it has long been
my view that Justice Scalia’s vitriol in his Romer dissent, though offensive and
hurtful to many, has been something of a gift to those favoring the equal
44
treatment of gays and lesbians.
There are so many offensive aspects of Justice Scalia’s dissent that I will
limit myself to a few as a means of example. For starters, Justice Scalia belittles
45
same-sex relationships by analogizing them to “long-time roommate[s],” he
class of persons must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.” Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993).
36. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–36.
37. Compare, e.g., State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 30 (Kan. 2005) (noting the Lawrence majority contains
an “oblique” indication that rational basis should apply to homosexual persons regarding a Kansas unlawful
voluntary sexual relations statute), with Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying
heightened scrutiny to the discharge of a military member under “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” before it was
repealed). Further, President Obama’s Department of Justice weighed in on the issue, concluding that “given a
number of factors, including a documented history of discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation
should be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny.” Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the United
States, to Hon. John A. Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
38. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). Justice Scalia, not
surprisingly, adopts this interpretation of the majority opinion. Romer, 517 U.S. at 642 n.1 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
39. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 636–53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 632.
43. See id. at 636–53.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 638.
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46

likens gays and lesbians to murderers, polygamists, and animal abusers, and he
mischaracterizes the political power and wealth of the gay and lesbian
47
community. Indeed, as to this last point, evidence shows that gay men suffer
poverty rates equal to heterosexual men, while lesbians suffer disproportionately
48
to heterosexual women. The poverty rates are even more striking for same-sex
lesbian couples and their children, with most instances demonstrating rates
49
double that of heterosexual couples and their children. And, even if Justice
Scalia’s point were true, suggesting that wealth, power, and influence support
50
negative constitutional treatment has little relevance. He also attacks Justice
Kennedy’s opinion, labeling Justice Kennedy’s reasoning as bordering on
51
“terminal silliness,” elitist, “facially absurd,” and without legal foundation.
52
While perhaps cathartic, none of this helps Justice Scalia to be persuasive.
The greatest challenge of Romer is trying to comprehend its reach. A fair
read of Romer is that, absent a reason extending beyond dislike of the group,
sexual minorities (and other disfavored groups) cannot be deprived of laws
53
protecting them from discrimination by a popular referendum. But soon after
Romer, it became clear that Justice Kennedy’s repeated references to the
extraordinary and far-reaching nature of Amendment 2 would make it possible
54
for lower courts to give a narrow interpretation to the decision.
Indeed, while Romer was pending before the Court, the issue of whether a
law enacted by the Cincinnati City Council protecting gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals from various forms of discrimination could constitutionally be
46. Id. at 644.
47. Id. at 645–46 (stating that homosexuals have “high disposable income” and “political power much
greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide”).
48. See RANDY ALBELDA ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, POVERTY IN THE LESBIAN, GAY, AND
BISEXUAL COMMUNITY (2009), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/AlbeldaBadgett-Schneebaum-Gates-LGB-Poverty-Report-March-2009.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
The UCLA study, which uses data from the Census Bureau, the National Family Growth Survey, and the
California Health Information Survey to generate household income data for gays, lesbians, same-sex couples,
and their children, concludes that “the myth of gay and lesbian affluence is just that—a myth.” Id. at iii. The
authors advise that “access to marriage may improve LGB family incomes and lift some families out of
poverty.” Id.
49. See id. at 5–7.
50. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 232
(1996) (noting that while many of the same stereotyped criticisms have been attached to Jews, “[s]urely Justice
Scalia would not allow Colorado to handicap Jews in elections”).
51. Romer, 517 U.S. at 639, 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Surely, Justice Kennedy’s Romer decision prompted him to receive some amount of hateful, anti-gay
mail. See KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 112 (noting that Justice Blackman sent a short note to Justice Kennedy,
telling him the Lawrence decision “took courage” and to expect “a lot of critical and even hateful mail”). I think
the likely level of mean-spiritedness only helps Justice Kennedy to see the very animus about which he wrote in
Romer. See Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
53. KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 108–12 (“The arguments that [Justice Kennedy] made could be applied
to any ‘politically unpopular group’ that is discriminated against because of a bare majoritarian ‘desire to harm’
it.”).
54. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
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overturned by a popular vote of the electorate was working its way to the
55
Supreme Court. When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the
Court reversed and remanded the issue to the Sixth Circuit for further
56
consideration in light of Romer. In joining Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas in dissenting to the majority’s reversal and remand, Justice Scalia
shockingly contended that Romer was entirely irrelevant to the Cincinnati
57
situation. Justice Scalia’s interpretation of Romer’s reach is both narrow and
telling:
Romer involved a state constitutional amendment prohibiting special
protection for homosexuals. The consequence of its holding is that
homosexuals in a city (or other electoral subunit) that wishes to accord
them special protection cannot be compelled to achieve a state
constitutional amendment in order to have the benefit of that democratic
58
preference.
Although the meaning of Justice Scalia’s interpretation is as narrow as it is hard
to discern, the Sixth Circuit understood it well enough to uphold the Cincinnati
59
referendum even in light of Romer. The Sixth Circuit did this even though the
Romer Court expressly avoided deciding the case on political participation
60
grounds, using Equal Protection instead.
Even more troubling and relevant to the issues covered in this Article is the
61
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning. The trial
judge, relying on Romer, had determined that a voter-passed initiative amending
the Nebraska Constitution to prohibit the state from recognizing same-sex
marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships, was “indistinguishable” from
62
Amendment 2 and, thus, invalid as a violation of Equal Protection. Seizing on
Justice Kennedy’s language about the “unprecedented” scope of Amendment 2,
the appellate judges found that an initiative that defines who may enter into a
63
marriage or a similar marriage-like arrangement is far narrower in scope.
Accordingly, the judges found that no assumption of animus should arise and that

55. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 128 F.3d 289 (1998).
56. Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1996).
57. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. See id.
59. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 128 F.3d at 301.
60. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–36 (1996). In 2006, the voters of Cincinnati voted to
reinstate and expand gay and lesbian anti-discrimination. Eric Resnick, Cincinnati Ready to Restore Human
Rights Ordinance, GAY PEOPLE’S CHRON. (Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/stories06/
march/0310061.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
61. 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
62. Id. at 865 (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 868 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
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the state’s asserted purpose of “encourag[ing] heterosexual couples to bear and
raise children in a committed marriage relationship” was rationally related to the
64
initiative’s purpose.
More recently, in Perry v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Romer
in determining that California’s Proposition 8 violated the U.S. Constitution’s
65
Equal Protection provisions. Whether that opinion is reconcilable with Bruning
66
and consistent with the meaning of Romer is discussed below. The Supreme
Court, should it reach the merits of the case, has the opportunity to determine the
67
reach of Romer. Thus, the question remains: what is the proper reach of Romer?
Just this year, Professor Kenji Yoshino noted that Justice Kennedy’s repeated
references to the “unprecedented” scope of Amendment 2 could make Romer a
68
“ticket good only for one day.” While Professor Yoshino is correct that the
Court could interpret Romer that narrowly, I do not think that is a fair read of the
opinion. I am more inclined to agree with Professor Knowles’ view:
[E]ven a more narrowly written amendment—whose impact on the legal
status of homosexuals was neither sweeping nor comprehensive—could
not pass constitutional muster as long as it was underpinned by the same
majoritarian, and morality-driven animus that Kennedy concluded was
69
the only way to explain the existence of Amendment 2.
The question then becomes whether there is a non-animus basis to support the
disparate treatment of gays and lesbians and the appropriate level of
constitutional scrutiny.
III. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS—THE END OF BOWERS AND THE
70
CELEBRATION OF LIBERTY
It is hard to overstate the importance of Lawrence, although, on its face, it
simply struck down the dozen or so state sodomy laws that still existed (and were
71
rarely enforced) in the country. In powerful and empathetic language, Justice
Kennedy humanizes gay and lesbian citizens by forcefully and directly

64. Id. at 867.
65. See 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
66. See infra Part III.
67. Compare, e.g., Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (construing Romer narrowly), with Perry, 671 F.3d 1052
(construing Romer broadly).
68. Yoshino, supra note 28, at 778.
69. KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 110.
70. See generally DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (2012).
71. The sodomy statute at issue in Lawrence was one of four in the country that criminalized only samesex sodomy (Texas being joined by Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma). Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573
(2003). Thirteen states had sodomy statutes that criminalized heterosexual sodomy as well. CARPENTER, supra
note 70, at 187.

10

01_LEVINE_VER_01_6-18-12_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

7/22/2013 2:31 PM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
72

overruling Bowers v. Hardwick. Justice Kennedy boldly states: “Bowers was not
73
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today,” adding that “[i]ts
74
continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”
Justice Kennedy understands that the reach of Bowers went far beyond the
75
criminalization of certain sex acts. During the seventeen-year reign of Bowers,
the decision was used to justify various forms of mistreatment of gays and
lesbians, including banning gays and lesbians from military service, permitting
76
discharge from employment based solely on sexual orientation, and banning
77
gays and lesbians from adopting children. Under Bowers, the moral disapproval
of the electorate, as evidenced by a majority vote of the legislature, was an
78
acceptable rational basis for laws disfavoring gays and lesbians.
Actually, Justice Kennedy’s rejection of Bowers is not all that surprising to
those who were attentive to his confirmation hearing and pre-Supreme Court
speeches and case decisions. Although prior to Romer, none of Judge or Justice
79
Kennedy’s decisions sided in favor of gay or lesbian petitioners, Justice
Kennedy’s pre-confirmation decisions and speeches nonetheless suggested an
openness to providing gays and lesbians some degree of constitutional
80
protection. For example, in a case upholding the Navy’s right to discharge a gay
sailor, then-Judge Kennedy suggested that had the case involved private,
consensual sex in a non-military context, the case may well have been decided
81
differently. Further, at his confirmation, Justice Kennedy did not hide his view
72. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a state
statute criminalizing private, consensual oral and anal sexual conduct).
73. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
77. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed,
in his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia scolded the majority for failing to cite Bowers, making the somewhat
persuasive point that if Bowers permits the criminalization of much of same-sex sexual expression, a state
should be permitted to refuse to provide anti-discrimination protections to gays and lesbians. See Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640–44 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Romer then may have implicitly overruled Bowers
although Bowers was never cited by the Romer majority. See id. at 623–36.
78. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). The lawyers working on the appeal recognized that
getting the Court to overrule Bowers would not be an easy task. See CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 197.
79. While on the appellate bench, Justice Kennedy ruled five times in cases dealing with gays and
lesbians, each time ruling against the gay side. JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN
AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 377 (2001). Primarily due to his record, Justice Kennedy’s 1987
nomination was opposed by gay organizations. See id. For example, Jeff Levi, on behalf of the National Gay
and Lesbian Task Force, testified against Justice Kennedy at the confirmation hearing, noting that “Justice
Kennedy’s notion of justice is too narrow for him to be worthy of a role as a final arbiter of the meaning of the
U.S. Constitution.” Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States Before the S. Comm. Of the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 427 (1989) [hereinafter Kennedy Hearing].
80. See COLUCCI, supra note 4; KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 125; MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 79, at
378–79.
81. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 1980). “The reasons which have led the court to
protect some private decisions intimately linked with one’s personality, see e.g. Roe . . . and family living
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that the Constitution should be interpreted beyond its text, embracing due process
82
protection for various forms of intimacy. Indeed, at his confirmation, when
asked about the factors a judge should consider when determining the reach of
83
the Constitution’s Due Process Clause, Justice Kennedy stated:
[An] abbreviated list of the considerations are the essentials of the right
to human dignity, the injury to the person, the harm to the person, the
anguish to the person, the inability of the person to manifest his or her
personality, the inability of a person to obtain his or her own self84
fulfillment, the inability of a person to reach his or her potential.
While these terms are broad and ill-defined, they foreshadow Justice Kennedy’s
articulation of some sort of liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
85
Process Clause.
Lawrence provided Justice Kennedy the opportunity to build on his earlier
comments about the importance of a constitutional protection of some sort of
sphere of intimacy. Framing the issue as “whether the petitioners were free as
adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the
86
Due Process Clause,” Justice Kennedy notes that the constitutional liberty
interest extends beyond just a spatial component to “an autonomy of self that
87
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”
Justice Kennedy determines that it is an easy task to find that private, consensual,
88
sexual conduct falls within this liberty interest.
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy sidesteps the traditional discussion of the right
to privacy as a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny, perhaps marking a

arrangements beyond the core nuclear family suggest that some kinds of government regulation of private
consensual homosexual behavior may face substantial constitutional challenge.” Id. (citations omitted).
82. Kennedy Hearing, supra note 79, at 180.
83. The line of questioning was in response to a question regarding “privacy” as then-Judge Kennedy
saw it. Although he was asked specifically about privacy, Kennedy answered that he prefers “to think of the
value of privacy as being protected by the liberty clause.” Id. at 121.
84. Kennedy Hearing, supra note 79, at 180.
85. See COLUCCI, supra note 4, at 13 (noting that unlike Bork, who is wedded to originalism, Justice
Kennedy looks to “moral concepts embodied by the text of the Constitution . . . [to] provide the basis for
determining the extent of the personal liberty that courts have a duty to enforce.”).
86. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
87. Id. at 562.
88. See id. at 578–79. In many ways, Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion is something of an homage to
Justice Stevens, who assigned Justice Kennedy the task of writing the opinion. Justice Stevens in his Bowers
dissent, a small part of which Justice Kennedy cites in Lawrence, wrote about the liberty interest invaded by the
majority’s approach. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 214–20 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). I must
confess that I had long struggled with Justice Steven’s opinion, finding Justice Blackmun’s dissent more in line
with the traditional thinking I brought to the issue. See id. at 199–214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion has helped me to better grasp the sheer beauty and depth of Justice Stevens’
dissent in Bowers.
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new direction of due process analysis for the Court. It is both elegant and
frustrating; its parameters remain undefined. To some measure, Lawrence blurs
the lines between Equal Protection and Due Process, shifting the focus to a
90
different, and possibly broader, concept of liberty. In lauding Justice Kennedy’s
approach in Lawrence, Professor Yoshino notes:
The Court evaded the charge that it was picking and choosing among
groups by highlighting that the right in question belonged to all persons
within the United States. Lawrence was ultimately not a group-based
equality case about gays, but rather a universal liberty case about the
right of all consenting adults to engage in sexual intimacy in the privacy
91
of their own homes.
The reach of the liberty interest Justice Kennedy articulated in Lawrence,
however, even by his own terms, reaches beyond private, consensual, sexual
92
conduct. Citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
93
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that “homosexual persons” are entitled to the
same level of constitutional protection as heterosexuals when it comes to
“choices central to personal dignity and autonomy” and that homosexuals like
heterosexuals have “the right to define [their] own concept of existence, of
94
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” The focus in
95
Lawrence then was on sameness, not difference. Of course, the parameters of
this ill-defined liberty interest remain to be determined.
As in Romer, Justice Kennedy provides little discussion of the state’s
96
asserted bases for the gay-focused sodomy law. Texas tried to provide a basis

89. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79. The case, of course, could have been resolved under the Equal
Protection Clause as the Texas sodomy statute only applied to same-sex sexual expression. Indeed, Justice
O’Connor in her concurrence elected to take that more traditional and narrower track by finding that, following
the logic of Romer, the Texas sodomy statute that singled out only homosexuals for punishment violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it was only based on animus toward the group affected. Id. at 599 (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
90. See id. at 578–79; Yoshino, supra note 28, at 802.
91. Yoshino, supra note 28, at 802; see also COLUCCI, supra note 4, at 22 (asserting that “[u]sing
‘liberty’ in place of ‘privacy’ avoids a textual objection, and it brings moral and practical considerations to the
forefront of constitutional adjudication”).
92. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
93. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
94. Id. at 574 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
95. See CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 189. Indeed, the lawyers for the petitioners in Lawrence had
hoped to highlight this perspective. See id. As Professor Carpenter explains: “To the extent that the members of
the Court believed that what they were being asked to protect in Bowers was difference, they were less likely to
grant it constitutional protection. To the extent that the Justices now believed what they were being asked to
protect in Lawrence was sameness, they could perhaps be persuaded to extend it constitutional protection.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
96. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563 (discussing only the law’s text and the case’s procedural history
before beginning his analysis).
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for its law, claiming that Texas had an interest in “the preservation of marriage,
families and the procreation of children” that transcended the moral disapproval
97
of gay people. Having had the good fortune to attend the oral argument in
October of 1995, I recall well that Justice Scalia was becoming increasingly
frustrated at the lawyer representing Texas because he refused to take the
position, ultimately taken by Justice Scalia in his dissent, that moral disapproval
98
by the majority was enough of a rational basis to justify the law. Justice
Kennedy rejected Texas’s asserted bases for the criminalization of same-sex
sodomy; he found that the only believable basis was majoritarian moral
99
disapproval, which could not serve as a valid justification for the law.
100
Further, as in Romer, Justice Scalia writes an angry dissent. He criticizes
101
the majority for its failure to adhere to stare decisis. He condemns the
majority’s position that the majoritarian belief that an act is immoral cannot serve
102
as a rational basis for such a law. Justice Scalia contends that such a view
portends the likely end to laws “against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
103
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity . . . .”
At its core, Justice Scalia’s dissent rejects Justice Kennedy’s move away from
“fundamental rights” language to a focus on the liberty interest of the Due
104
Process Clause. Justice Scalia adheres to the Bowers majority’s approach,
requiring a finding that permitting same-sex couples to engage in private,
consensual, sexual conduct must be either deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
105
or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. He then, of course, rejects the
notion that changing attitudes could influence an interpretation of the Due
Process Clause, criticizing Justice Kennedy’s position that an “emerging
awareness” is somehow relevant to whether the conduct in Lawrence merits
106
constitutional protection.
Justice Scalia does raise a powerful criticism of Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion if one assumes it is based on traditional due process jurisprudence: if the

97. CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Charles Rosenthal,
the lawyer for Texas, at oral argument for Lawrence).
98. See id. at 243–44. As an observer of the oral argument, I can say too that, though Justice Kennedy
was an active participant in the oral argument, he was inscrutable; in no way could one discern Justice
Kennedy’s position from the argument.
99. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78. For this point, Justice Kennedy cited the Stevens dissent: “[T]he fact
that a governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
100. See id. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 586–92.
102. Id. at 599.
103. Id. at 590.
104. See id. at 586.
105. See id. at 593–94.
106. Id. at 590.
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majority is indeed finding some sort of fundamental right, even if going under the
name of “liberty,” strict scrutiny rather than the kind of rational basis review
107
employed by Justice Kennedy would apply. In this key way, Lawrence (and
Romer) may represent something of a sea-change that has led some to talk in
terms of a “rational basis with a bite” standard that is applied to gays and
108
lesbians. While it is evident that Justice Kennedy did not use a highly
deferential form of rational basis in Romer or Lawrence, it is also clear that the
Court has yet to decide the specific issue of whether gays and lesbians are
109
entitled to some form of heightened scrutiny.
But Justice Scalia’s dissent does more than disagree with the majority
110
opinion. Just as in Bowers, the Scalia dissent “demeans” (to use Justice
111
112
Kennedy’s term) gays and lesbians throughout. By likening gays and lesbians
113
to those who commit incest, adultery, and bestiality, Justice Scalia brings to the
fore exactly the kind of animus toward gays and lesbians that pushes a person of
compassion in the opposite direction. Justice Scalia accuses Justice Kennedy of
embracing “the homosexual agenda,” which seemingly includes the desire to be
114
treated equally under the Constitution.
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy recognizes the humanity of gay and lesbian
115
citizens. He grasps the broad and pernicious impact of sodomy laws and
116
recognizes the autonomy and dignity of gays and lesbians. In essence, Justice
Kennedy once again refuses to leave gays and lesbians outside the Constitution;
117
he refuses for gays and lesbians to be a “stranger to [the] law[].”
Lawrence marks an important victory for gay and lesbian constitutional
rights and Justice Kennedy gets there via a powerful and compassionate

107. Id. at 586.
108. See Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 807,
811 (2006).
109. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
110. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. See, e.g., id. at 525 (referring to Bowers: “Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of
homosexual persons.”).
112. See id. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 590 (noting “the impossibility of distinguishing homosexuality from other traditional ‘morals’
offenses”).
114. Id. at 602. In the same way that Justice Scalia’s vitriol may have proven counterproductive, the
highly offensive tone of some of the amicus briefs submitted in support of the Texas sodomy law may well have
horrified Justice Kennedy and others by their venomous tone. See CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 204–06
(discussing the Liberty Counsel amicus brief that asserted that the overruling of the Texas sodomy law was a
part of a gay agenda designed to destroy families and religion using language from a satirical essay in a gay
publication and other highly-offensive amicus briefs).
115. As Professor Suzanne Goldberg put it: “[Lawrence] removes the reflexive assumption of gay
people’s inferiority. Bowers took away the humanity of gay people, and this decision give it back.” CARPENTER,
supra note 70, at 264 (quoting Suzanne Goldberg) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
117. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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opinion. That said, Justice Kennedy employs an approach that is innovative,
unorthodox, and largely ill-defined. As Professor Parshall explains: “Lawrence
neither defined the liberty interest it protected as fundamental, nor clearly applied
119
the traditional rational basis test associated with non-fundamental rights.”
While a departure from traditional due process analysis, Justice Kennedy’s
120
approach in Lawrence has many positive attributes as well. For example, legal
scholars have praised his liberty-based focus as being more inclusive and
121
universal in its reach than the traditional privacy approach. Nonetheless, courts
122
and commentators struggle with the actual meaning and reach of the decision.
Justice Kennedy’s unorthodox approach relying on a yet-to-be-defined
123
concept of liberty has allowed lower courts to interpret Lawrence narrowly. As
Professor Kelly Strader points out, because of the ambiguity in the applicable test
and because of the uncertain reach of the concept of liberty, some courts have
viewed the effect of Lawrence to not extend beyond rendering sodomy laws to be
124
unconstitutional. In so doing, these courts have ignored Justice Kennedy’s
determination in Lawrence that moral disapproval alone is not an adequate
125
justification.
It is hard to imagine that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence and his
conception of liberty are limited to a debate on the constitutionality of sodomy
126
statutes. The opinion is rife with references to autonomy, dignity, and self-

118. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–79.
119. Lisa K. Parshall, Redefining Due Process Analysis: Justice Kennedy and the Concept of Emergent
Rights, 69 ALB. L. REV. 237, 238 (2005); see also Randy E. Barnett, Grading Justice Kennedy: A Reply to
Professor Carpenter, 8 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1587 (2005) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s opinion “strayed from
seemingly well-settled due process doctrine”).
120. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
121. Yoshino, supra note 28, at 803; see also Barnett supra note 119, at 1589 (while agreeing with some
of the criticism of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, labels Lawrence “a ‘potentially revolutionary’ liberty-protecting
case”).
122. As Professor Cass Sunstein puts it: “Lawrence’s words sound in due process, but much of its music
involves equal protection.” Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality,
and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 30 (2004); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1916 (2004).
123. Compare, e.g., Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006)
(construing Romer narrowly), with Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (construing Romer broadly).
124. Strader, supra note 5, at 57–60; see also Rosky, supra note 5, at 966.
125. Strader, supra note 5, at 43 (citing Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for
Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1281 (2004)). For example, in a
decision upholding a law banning the sale of sex toys, the Eleventh Circuit stated: “[W]e do not read
Lawrence . . . to have rendered public morality altogether illegitimate as a rational basis.” Williams v. Morgan,
478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007). But see Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, in which the Fifth Circuit, relying
on Lawrence, reaches the opposite conclusion, highlighting the ambiguity of the reach of Lawrence. 517 F.3d
738 (5th Cir. 2008). Further, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a law banning the right of gays and lesbians to adopt
children, Lawrence notwithstanding. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th
Cir. 2004); see also Rosky, supra note 5, at 966.
126. Justice Kennedy has raised this conception of liberty in various contexts including in the oral
argument on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. Adam Liptak, The Patient Protection and
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determination. That said, Justice Kennedy perhaps prudently and appropriately
limited the reach of the decision to the issue before the Court: the
128
constitutionality of Texas’s sodomy law. Future cases will further define the
reach of Lawrence. Whether Lawrence portends Justice Kennedy’s support of a
constitutional challenge to a law limiting marriage to heterosexuals will be
discussed shortly. Before that topic, I will discuss briefly Perry v. Brown, as that
129
decision provides the vehicle to bring the marriage-equality issue to the Court.
IV. PERRY V. BROWN—OVERTURNING CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 8 IN THE
130
NAME OF ROMER
The issue of marriage equality is now before the United States Supreme
131
Court. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Perry v. Brown, in
which the Ninth Circuit determined that California’s Proposition 8 (which took
away the marriage rights that had been given to gays and lesbians by the
California Supreme Court in May 2008) violated the Equal Protection Clause of
132
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
133
The Perry case crystallizes the debate about the reach of Romer. First, there
is nothing surprising that a case involving a state referendum specifically taking
away rights from gays, lesbians, and bisexuals would implicate Romer, despite
the claims of some journalists that the opinion was some shameless attempt to
134
curry favor with Justice Kennedy on a possible appeal to the Court. Both the
Affordable Health Care Act, Appealing to a Justice’s Notion of Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2012, at A1.
127. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
128. See id. at 562–79. Indeed, the lawyer who argued the case for the petitioners before the Court, Paul
Smith, made clear that they were asking the Court to “get rid” of sodomy laws and were not “worried about
establishing a precedent for the eleven other things that came after that.” CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 197.
129. See infra Part IV.
130. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, No.
12-144, 2012 WL 3134429 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012).
131. As mentioned earlier, constitutional challenges to DOMA are also before the Court. See supra note
12.
132. 671 F.3d at 1096. The Perry decision lays out the long and convoluted process that ultimately
brought the issue of the constitutionality of Proposition 8 to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1066–68. In a nutshell, in
May of 2008, the California Supreme Court determined California’s law limiting marriage to heterosexuals was
unconstitutional under the California Constitution. Id. at 1067. Proposition 8 was passed by a majority of voters
in November 2008, overturning by initiative the California Supreme Court’s marriage decision. Id. Before
Proposition 8 was passed, however, over 18,000 same-sex couples were legally wed in California. Id. The
California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 8 under the California Constitution. Id. at
1068. Plaintiffs, after being denied marriage licenses, filed a federal challenge, and in May 2009, after a twelveday bench trial, Federal District Judge Vaughn Walker determined that Proposition 8 violated the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 1069. In February 2012, the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel hearing the appeal to Judge
Walker’s decision agreed. Id. at 1052. In June 2012, the Ninth Circuit declined to rehear Perry. Id. at 1065.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari under the name Hollingsworth v. Perry. Id., cert. granted,
2012 WL 3134429.
133. See id. at 1080–85.
134. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Gay Marriage Ruling a Memo to Justice Kennedy: Noah Feldman,
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Perry majority and dissent agree on the relevance of Romer; their disagreement
135
revolves around their interpretation of the reach of the Romer decision itself.
Perry provides the Supreme Court the opportunity to better define the reach of
Romer.
The Ninth Circuit majority went to great lengths to keep its decision
California-centric, noting repeatedly that it was reaching its decision on the
unconstitutionality of Proposition 8 in the specific context of a state that
conferred equal marriage rights on gays and lesbians, then took them away via
popular initiative, while maintaining its other broad legal protections for gays and
136
lesbians. Sidestepping the controversial issue of whether the U.S. Constitution
confers upon gays and lesbians an equal right to marriage, the majority held that
“[b]y using their initiative power to target a minority group and withdraw a right
that it possessed, without a legitimate reason for doing so, the People of
137
California violated the Equal Protection Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Or, as the court explained earlier in the opinion:
We need not and do not answer the broader question in this case [of
whether gays and lesbians have a constitutional right to marry] . . .
because California had already extended to committed same-sex couples
both the incidents of marriage and the official designation of ‘marriage,’
and Proposition 8’s only effect was to take away that important and
legally significant designation, while leaving in place all of its
138
incidents.
Whether the specific context so important to the majority proves to be a
meaningful distinction in terms of federal constitutional law remains to be seen.
But California’s near-equal treatment of gay and lesbian couples surely makes it
harder to show that there is a rational basis supporting Proposition 8.

BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-08/gay-marriage-ruling-a-memoto-justice-kennedy-commentary-by-noah-feldman.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
135. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1104–05 (Smith, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Romer and stating that it
does not “directly” control).
136. See, e.g., id. at 1076. Many thought that the narrowness of the opinion would make it less likely for
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Jason Mazzone, Marriage and the Ninth Circuit: Thumbs Down,
BALKINIZATION (Feb. 7, 2012), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/02/marriage-and-ninth-circuit-thumbs-down
.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). But see David Cole, Gambling with Gay Marriage, N.Y. REV.
OF BOOKS (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/feb/09/gambling-gay-marriage/ (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review). However, the Court may well have decided to hear an appeal because the case
raises issues regarding the reach of Romer and arguably conflicts with the Eighth Circuit’s Bruning opinion.
137. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1096.
138. Id. at 1064.
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The Romer analogy was determinative to the majority; indeed in their view,
139
Romer “compel[led]” them to strike down Proposition 8. The majority
explained, freely citing Romer:
Proposition 8 is remarkably similar to Amendment 2. Like Amendment
2, Proposition 8 “single[s] out a certain class of citizens for disfavored
legal status. . . .” Like Amendment 2, Proposition 8 has the “peculiar
property” of “withdraw[ing] from homosexuals, but not others’’ an
existing legal right . . . that has been broadly available, notwithstanding
the fact that the Constitution did not compel the state to confer it in the
first place. Like Amendment 2, Proposition 8 denies “equal protection of
the laws in the most literal sense” because it “carves out” an “exception”
to California’s equal protection clause. . . . Like Amendment 2,
Proposition 8 “by its very decree . . . put[s] [homosexuals] in a solitary
class with respect to” an important aspect of human relations, and
accordingly “imposes a special disability upon [homosexuals] alone.”
And like Amendment 2, Proposition 8 constitutionalizes that disability,
meaning gays and lesbians may overcome it “only by enlisting the
citizenry of [the state] to amend the State Constitution” for a second
140
time.
The Perry majority quickly dismissed the Eighth Circuit’s Bruning decision,
which upheld an even more far-reaching voter-backed constitutional initiative on
the ground that Romer extended only to far-reaching initiatives, simply noting
that “Proposition 8 is no less problematic than Amendment 2 merely because its
effect is narrower; to the contrary, the surgical precision with which it excises a
141
right belonging to gay and lesbian couples makes it even more suspect.”
Not surprisingly, the Perry dissent distinguishes the Proposition 8 challenges
142
from Amendment 2 because of Proposition 8’s narrow reach. Thus, in the view
of the dissenter, Romer did not command a finding of Proposition 8’s
143
unconstitutionality.
Ultimately, the majority, relying on an exhaustive record created by the trial
144
court, debunks all of the purported bases for depriving gays and lesbians access
145
to marriage. Thus, based on the record, the majority concludes that, as in
139. See id. at 1080–85.
140. Id. at 1081 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1104 (Smith, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1097.
144. The Federal District Court Judge who heard the Perry case required a twelve-day bench trial,
complete with nineteen witnesses that led to a detailed and thoughtful opinion debunking all of the arguments
made by Proposition 8 proponents and justifying the end to marriage equality in California. For a thoughtful and
detailed discussion of the trial court’s opinion, see Rosky, supra note 5.
145. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1092–95.
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146

Romer, animus has to be the only explanation for the passage of Proposition 8.
Unlike in Romer, in which Justice Kennedy dismisses Colorado’s asserted
justifications for Amendment 2 in one short paragraph, the Perry majority
provides a detailed account of how the purported justifications for Proposition 8
ring hollow, largely based on California’s still existing domestic-partnership law
147
that confers the benefits of marriage on registered same-sex couples.
Perry provides the Court the occasion to weigh in on the marriage-equality
issue in a limited context. The California-centric focus of the opinion may
148
persuade the Court to decide the marriage-equality issue on narrow grounds.
V. ROMER, LAWRENCE, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF JUSTICE KENNEDY’S SUPPORT
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL MARRIAGE EQUALITY
Neither Romer nor Lawrence dictates the outcome of the marriage-equality
issue. Romer is most relevant to an Equal Protection challenge involving a
149
popular referendum on the issue of marriage equality. Whether Romer means
that a State cannot, via initiative, ban gays and lesbians access to legal marriage
absent a significant reason may find its way to the Court in the not too distant
future, perhaps in the context of the Perry case.
Likewise, Lawrence does not predetermine the outcome in a marriage150
equality case. Throughout the Lawrence opinion, Justice Kennedy made
various references asserting that the reach of the opinion does not necessarily
151
extend to the issue of marriage equality. Relatively early in the Lawrence
opinion, Justice Kennedy, though noting with sensitivity the broad harm inflicted
by sodomy statutes on gay people, adds “the [sodomy] statutes do seek to control
a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
152
criminals.” Finally, near the end of the opinion, Justice Kennedy stresses that
146. Id. at 1093.
147. Id. at 1076–80. The dissent, in a temperately written opinion that notes how deferential the rational
basis standard tends to be, finds that there are some plausible justifications for Proposition 8, such as promoting
procreational responsibility. Id. at 1097 (Smith, J., dissenting).
148. See Andrew Koppelman, Online Forum, Reaction: Salvaging Perry, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 69
(2012), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/125/march12/forum_828.php (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit purposefully narrowed the “legal claim” of the case in an attempt to
limit its application to California); see also Robin West, Online Forum, A Marriage Is a Marriage Is a
Marriage: The Limits of Perry v. Brown, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 47 (2012), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/
issues/125/march12/forum_848.php (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s
decision has been “widely lauded . . . by marriage equality proponents for its creative minimalism”).
149. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
150. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
151. See id.
152. Id. at 567 (emphasis added). Soon thereafter, Justice Kennedy adds that a state should avoid
defining the nature of an adult relationship “absent . . . abuse of an institution the law protects.” Id. (emphasis
added).
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the case “does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition
153
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.” While this language
can support the argument that Lawrence does not necessarily find that a liberty
interest encompasses marriage equality, nothing in the majority opinion
154
forecloses such a finding either.
That Justice Kennedy takes particular care to exempt the marriage issue from
the reach of the opinion is no surprise for several reasons. First and foremost, that
issue was not before the Court; the case involved the constitutionality of sodomy
155
laws and nothing about the definition of marriage. Another reason that the
Lawrence majority opinion does not embrace marriage equality is because the
lawyers for the Petitioners went to great lengths to assure the Court that it could
overrule Bowers without having to do so, asserting specifically that the case was
156
not about “any right to affirmative state recognition or benefits.”
Only one Justice interprets Lawrence as resolving the marriage-equality
157
issue—Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia bluntly asserts that Lawrence “dismantles
the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made
between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in
158
marriage is concerned” because he rather surprisingly accepts that the only
reason for the disparate treatment is the moral disapproval of permitting gays and
159
lesbians to have equal access to the institution of marriage. Justice Scalia
concedes that encouraging procreation is not a believable basis for treating gays
160
differently from straights in the marriage context, although many advocates of
161
a heterosexual monopoly on marriage argue to the contrary. Indeed, none of the
decisions in which a court has upheld restricting marriages to heterosexuals has
done so based solely on the right of a majority to express their displeasure with
the notion of gays and lesbians being permitted to legally wed, which to Justice

153. Id. at 578.
154. Professor Carpenter notes that in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy remains “agnostic” on the issue of
whether “gays might aspire to formal recognition” of their relationships. CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 260.
Justice Kennedy’s silence on the issue stands in contrast to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in which she
strongly suggests that her Equal Protection-based opinion does not impose a state obligation of marriage
equality. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). “Texas cannot assert any legitimate state
interest here, such as . . . preserving the traditional institution of marriage. . . . Unlike the moral disapproval of
same-sex relations . . . other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval
of an excluded group.” Id.
155. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
156. CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the petitioner’s
reply brief).
157. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 604.
159. Id. at 605.
160. Id. (stating that “encouragement of procreation” cannot be the basis “since the sterile and the
elderly are allowed to marry”).
161. Anderson v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 969 (Wash. 2006) (upholding the law banning gay marriage
in part because it “furthers procreation, essential to the survival of the human race”).
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Scalia would be an appropriate justification. But it is quite clear that Justice
Scalia will not be siding with marriage-equality advocates any time soon, even
though he believes that a constitutional right to marriage equality is preordained
162
by Lawrence. While Justice Scalia’s Lawrence dissent discusses at length the
impropriety of the majority’s rejection of stare decisis when it overruled
163
Bowers, Justice Scalia admits that he does not “believe in rigid adherence to
164
stare decisis in constitutional cases.” Surely, Justice Scalia will not feel bound
to follow Lawrence.
VI. THE LIKELY KENNEDY VOTE
Neither Romer nor Lawrence, then, predetermines the result in a
165
constitutional marriage-equality case. Similarly, these decisions do not provide
a certain answer to how Justice Kennedy will vote when confronted with the
marriage-equality issue.
Justice Kennedy understands the impact that Romer and Lawrence have had
on the lives of real people, and I have every reason to agree with Professor Pam
Karlan’s gleeful pronouncement that Justice Kennedy knows and likes gay
166
people. In contrast to Justice Powell, who, while struggling with how to vote in
Bowers, famously proclaimed that he had never met a gay person even though he
167
had a gay law clerk at the time he made that comment, Justice Kennedy’s close
168
friendships have included gays and lesbians. While there is ample evidence that
having close gay friends positively affects one’s attitudes regarding
169
170
homosexuals, and while Justice Kennedy is a person of compassion, he will
base his vote on same-sex marriage issues on his interpretation of the relevant

162. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 587.
164. Id.
165. See supra Part V.
166. David. G. Savage, Gay Marriage Fight May Hinge on Supreme Court’s Anthony Kennedy, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/08/nation/la-na-marriage-kennedy-20120209 (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review). Professor Karlan said of Justice Kennedy: “He is a California establishment
Republican with moderately libertarian instincts. . . . He travels in circles where he has met and likes lots of gay
people.” Id.
167. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 79, at 272–75.
168. See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, What Will Justice Kennedy Do?, TIME, June 7, 2012,
at 28. Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s close friend and mentor, Gordon Schaber, the long-time dean of McGeorge
School of Law, was assumed to be gay by many people who knew him, though it was not a topic he and others
discussed openly. Id.
169. Michael J. Brown & Ernesto Henriquez, Socio-Demographic Predictors of Attitudes Towards Gays
and Lesbians, 6 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES RESEARCH 192, 195, 197 (2008), available at http://homepage.mac.
com/psychresearch/Sites/site2/publications/manuscripts/brown_henriquez.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
170. KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 197 (referring to the “humane element of Justice Kennedy’s
jurisprudence”).
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law, including his evolving definition of the meaning and scope of liberty. To
be sure, judges cannot fully insulate themselves from their life experiences,
172
upbringing, faith, and family, but I truly believe most, and Justice Kennedy
173
particularly, try hard to do so.
How, then, will Justice Kennedy rule when confronted with the issue of
whether it is constitutional to limit marriage to heterosexuals? To a large
measure, the answer depends on how the issue is framed and when the issue gets
to the Court.
The Perry case provides an opportunity for the Court to decide a marriage174
related case and to do so in a somewhat narrow context. Ironically, Judge
Reinhardt’s effort to draft a California-centric opinion in Perry, perhaps to
minimize the likelihood that the case would be heard by the Supreme Court, may
have enticed the Court to hear the case due to the narrowness of the issue. The
Court would be able to take its first step into what will likely be an ongoing legal
battle about same-sex marriage rights without having to grapple with the more
controversial issue of whether the Constitution commands that all states permit
marriage rights to gays and lesbians. Perry provides the Court the opportunity to
175
decide the proper scope of Romer, currently very much in dispute. Until
recently, there has been little desire to bring a federal challenge and Supreme
Court appeal to these so-called mini-DOMAs out of fear that a bad ruling would
176
be a major setback for gay and lesbian rights. Now that a case involving a

171. My view that the Justices successfully put aside their own personal views when deciding cases may
be overly optimistic, however. The public opinion of the Supreme Court is at its lowest point in recent history
with three-quarters of the respondents in a recent poll stating that the Justices’ opinions are influenced by their
political and personal views. See Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44%
in Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, at A1.
172. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 8 (2010).
173. Professor Colucci posits that Justice Kennedy’s “reliance on liberty and human dignity—criticized
by Scalia as merely Kennedy’s personal preference—is likely inspired by his Catholicism.” COLUCCI, supra
note 4, at 31. He specifically asserts that Justice Kennedy’s focus on human dignity in Lawrence is
“characteristically Catholic.” Id. at 33. Professor Colucci then, with a quick reference, notes that Justice
Kennedy conforms to the position of the Catholic Church in Lawrence by noting that the decision does not
involve the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. Id. at 34–35. If Justice Kennedy should decide against a
constitutional requirement of marriage equality, he will not do so to conform to positions of the Catholic
Church. Justice Kennedy is quite capable of adopting a constitutional interpretation that puts him at odds with
the position of his church. For example, Justice Kennedy, despite his deep commitment to the Roman Catholic
faith, has gone against church doctrine in the abortion context because of his interpretation of the Due Process
Clauses. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
174. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
175. Compare Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) (interpreting
the reach of Romer narrowly), with Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (interpreting the reach of Romer more broadly).
176. Koppelman, supra note 148, at 69 (noting that gay rights litigators such as Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders and the Lambda Legal Defense Fund “feared a premature appeal to the Supreme
Court, generating a decision that same-sex couples do not have the right to marry”). A substantial majority of
states have passed laws or constitutional amendments that seek to prohibit gays and lesbians from having access
to the institution of marriage. Because of their similarity to the federal Defense of Marriage Act, they are
commonly referred to as “mini-DOMAs.”
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popular vote on marriage equality is before the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy
and the Court will have the opportunity to discuss the scope of his Romer
decision. It is hard to imagine that Romer is as narrow as some courts, such as the
177
Bruning court, found it. Justice Kennedy will not be quick to overturn the vote
of the people, but he will do so unless there is an adequate showing made to
justify the law just as he did in Romer. In light of Judge Walker’s exhaustive trial
178
record debunking the asserted bases in support of Proposition 8, along with the
detailed discussion by Judge Reinhart of the disconnect of those asserted bases in
179
the California context, the Court may well decide the case on narrow grounds.
Should the Court decide Perry on the merits, a strong case can be made that
the only valid bases for Proposition 8 are the sort of moral and religious
180
justifications that Justice Kennedy would likely find unacceptable. Like the
181
California Supreme Court in the Marriage Cases, the Ninth Circuit majority in
Perry determined that California gays and lesbians had the constitutional right to
marry because the asserted bases to bar them from marriage rang hollow in a
state that largely treats its gay and lesbian couples equally to its heterosexual
182
couples. There does seem something peculiar about the fact that those states
that treat their gay and lesbian citizens with dignity are those on which a federal
constitutional requirement of marriage equality will most likely be imposed,
while those states that are largely dismissive of the rights of their gay and lesbian
183
inhabitants will avoid having to provide equal marriage access.
It seems inevitable that the Court eventually will have to confront the broader
constitutional challenge to the laws of most states that restrict marriage to
heterosexuals. Indeed, former Solicitor General Ted Olson, who, along with
David Boies, is famously leading the federal constitutional charge against
California’s Proposition 8, recently made clear that the goal should be for a
177. As Professor Knowles explained, “even a more narrowly written amendment—whose impact on
the legal status of homosexuals was neither sweeping nor comprehensive—could not pass constitutional muster
as long as it was underpinned by the same majoritarian, and morality-driven animus that Kennedy concluded
was the only way to explain the existence of Amendment 2.” KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 110.
178. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
179. Perry, 671 F.3d 1052.
180. See Rosky, supra note 5, at 983.
181. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
182. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1076–77.
183. See Will Ripley & Brandom Rittiman, Emotional Testimony Couldn’t Save Colorado’s Civil
Unions Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 14, 2012), http://www.9news.com/rss/story.aspx?storyid=267940 (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review). This somewhat perverse situation has not gone unnoticed. Recently, in an
effort to prevent passage of a bill to permit same sex-civil unions in Colorado, the argument was made that
doing so would be the precursor to the judicial imposition of same-sex marriage. See id. Brian Raum, attorney
for the Alliance Defense Fund, argued in front of the State Affairs Committee that, “[a]chieving civil unions is a
calculated step to achieving court-ordered same sex marriage. Opposing same-sex marriage while supporting
civil unions is akin to the Trojans dragging a wood horse into the middle of Troy.” Id. Raum offered New
Jersey, Connecticut, and California—where civil union proponents eventually filed for the legalization of samesex marriage—as proof. Id.
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Supreme Court decision mandating all states to permit gays and lesbians equal
184
access to marriage. Decisions by the Supreme Court striking down existing
185
state laws on constitutional grounds, of course, are not unprecedented. They are
often controversial, however.
The Court in general and Justice Kennedy in particular believe in incremental
186
steps. Indeed, in discussing Roe v. Wade at Columbia Law School, Justice
Ginsburg recently stated, “It’s not that the judgment was wrong, but it moved too
187
far too fast.” Justice Ginsburg seemed to suggest that the Court should have
waited to decide such a contentious issue in order to give the states more time to
188
work through it. The Justices, including Justice Kennedy, might find this
sentiment persuasive, especially in light of the fierce debate currently raging
189
about marriage equality.
While important, the ending of sodomy laws in Lawrence had a limited
impact, as relatively few states had sodomy statutes and those that did rarely
190
enforced them. The Supreme Court affected sixteen states when it struck down

184. Hardball with Chris Matthews (MSNBC television broadcast May 10, 2012), available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/47356785/ns/msnbc_tv-hardball_with_chris_matthews/t/hardball-chris-matthew
s-thursday-may/#.T-umj2iIn14 [hereinafter Olson Interview] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (Mr.
Olson analogizing the current struggle for marriage equality to the fight to overturn laws that restricted marriage
to persons of the same race).
185. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
186. Parshall, supra note 119, at 246 (“Romer was a spare opinion, only fourteen pages long and its
failure to confront Bowers seemed a cautious effort to avoid addressing its continued legitimacy. Furthermore,
Romer ‘represent[ed] an incremental, but important step in affording gay Americans the full benefits of the
Equal Protection Clause.’” (quoting Katherine M. Hamill, Romer v. Evans: Dulling the Equal Protection Gloss
On Bowers v. Hardwick, 77 B.U. L. REV. 655, 684 (1997)); see also, CARPENTER, supra note 70, at 196 (noting
that “the Supreme Court is ordinarily a cautious, minimalist, and incremental institution”).
187. Debra Cassens Weiss, Justice Ginsburg: Roe v. Wade Decision Came Too Soon, ABA J. ONLINE
(Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/justice_ginsburg_roe_v._wade_decision_came_too_
soon/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
188. See id.
189. On May 8, 2012, the voters of North Carolina overwhelming passed a far-reaching voter initiative
that not only bans same-sex marriage but also the recognition of other sorts of legally created relationships, such
as civil unions and domestic partnerships. The next day, President of the United States, Barack Obama,
expressed his personal support for the right of gays and lesbians to legally marry. The President did add that he
believed that this was an issue for the states, however. Thirty-one states have had popular votes limiting marriage to
heterosexuals. See Campbell Robertson, In North Carolina, Beliefs Clash on Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 11,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/us/in-north-carolina-gay-rights-not-a-simple-issue.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); see also Phil Gast, Obama Announces He Supports Same-Sex Marriage, CNN (May 09,
2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-05-09/politics/politics_obama-same-sex-marriage_1_gay-marriage-civil-unionsword-marriage?_s=PM:POLITICS (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Recently, a Nevada District Court judge
held that limiting marriage to a man and a woman was a legitimate state interest and excluding same-sex couples is
rationally related to that purpose. Sevcik v. Sandoval, No. 2:12-cv-00578-RCJ-PAL, 2012 WL 5989662 (D. Nev.
Nov. 26, 2012). On the other hand, in the recent general election, the voters in three states voted to provide gays and
lesbians access to the institution of marriage. Honan, supra note 6 (Maine, Maryland, and Washington).
190. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
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191

laws banning interracial marriage, and the Court’s unanimous result could
hardly have held much surprise in light of the civil rights victories that were
192
taking place. Conversely, when the Court decided Roe v. Wade, only four states
193
had completely repealed their antiabortion laws. Currently, fewer than a
handful of states have full marriage equality; many states continue to struggle
194
with how they will define marriage. Even many of the strongest advocates for
marriage equality see the debate playing out at the state level. For example, in a
recent MSNBC interview, Evan Wolfson, who has been fighting longer and
harder for marriage equality than just about anyone, parted ways with Ted Olson
195
and suggested a Supreme Court case at this point would be premature. Mr.
Wolfson noted:
[T]he President is also right that the way our country gets there is
through a patchwork of struggle, in which some states advance further
faster, other states regress and struggle. The country debates, and it
creates a climate that enables the Court to ultimately do the right
196
thing . . . .
A premature Supreme Court decision could lead to a decision harmful to the
197
marriage-equality cause.

191. Loving v. Virigina, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW,
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1966/1966_395 (last visited Aug. 28, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
192. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (striking down Florida’s prohibition on
interracial cohabitation law just three years before the Loving v. Virginia decision). Public attitudes, however,
did not support the Court’s decision. Public polling in 1963 had public support for bans on interracial marriage
at sixty-three percent, yet public backlash towards the court was lacking after the Loving decision. Jane S.
Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV.
1153, 1155–56 (2009) (citing polling numbers from HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN
AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 238–39 (rev. ed. 1997)).
193. Rachel Benson Gold, Lessons from Before Roe: Will Past Be Prologue? 6 GUTTMACHER REP. ON
PUB. POL’Y 8 (2003), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/06/1/gr060108.html#box (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review). Alaska, Washington, New York, and Hawaii had repealed their antiabortion laws,
replacing them with statutes allowing abortion when deemed necessary by the woman and her physician. Id.
194. See LAMBDA LEGAL, supra note 6.
195. See Olson Interview, supra note 184.
196. Id.
197. For example, in the interracial marriage context, the Supreme Court first upheld a state law banning
interracial marriage in Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 483 (1956). As racial tensions grew after Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court waited thirteen years to invalidate state bars to interracial marriage
in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Perhaps as an incremental step, the Supreme Court struck down a state
prohibition on interracial cohabitation to test the waters of the polity so-to-speak in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964).
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The passage of time favors the advocates for marriage equality. Author
Jeffrey Toobin noted in 2005:
[Kennedy’s] opinions in the Colorado and Texas cases have made him
the Court’s most visible defender of gay rights, but his support of gay
marriage, a subject that many expect the Court will eventually take on,
seems far from certain. In the Lawrence decision, Kennedy cited a
consensus in “Western civilization” against punishing homosexual
sodomy. But foreign traditions of tolerance for homosexual activity have
198
not led to broad international support for gay marriage . . . .
That was nearly a decade ago, and the number of countries that join the four he
199
noted has now expanded the count to eleven. Further, I believe that Toobin
overstates the influence of what is done by most of “Western civilization” on
200
Justice Kennedy’s decision-making. What is surely more relevant are the
quickly changing attitudes on marriage equality here in the United States. When
Toobin wrote his piece in 2005, approximately thirty-nine percent of Americans
201
favored marriage equality. Now, some polls show that there is majority support
202
for marriage equality with consistent trending in that direction.

198. Toobin, supra note 4, at 51. And there is the lesson of Bowers v. Hardwick, still very much in the
minds of those advocating for gay and lesbian rights. See 478 U.S.186 (1986).
199. LAMBDA LEGAL, supra note 6. Since 2005, South Africa, Norway, Sweden, Argentina, Iceland,
Portugal, and Denmark joined the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, and Spain in recognizing same-sex marriages.
Several other countries (twenty-five) recognize non-marital partnership registration, including the United
Kingdom, Israel, Germany, France, and Australia, to name a few. Id. Other countries appear to be moving
toward marriage equality as well. See Andrew Potts, Colombia Debates Same-Sex Marriage Ahead of Deadline,
GAYSTARNEWS (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/colombia-debates-same-sex-marriageahead-deadline240812 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (Colombia is currently debating whether to
expand marriage to same-sex couples.); Pablo Fernandez, Uruguay's Gay Marriage Law Approved by Lower
House, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/12/uruguay-gay-marriagelower-house-approval-_n_2284377.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (Legislation extending
marriage to gays and lesbians is currently working through Uruguay’s legislative process.).
200. See Toobin, supra note 4, at 51.
201. See id.
202. See Nate Silver, Gay Marriage Opponents Now in the Minority, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2011),
http://fivethiryeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/20/gay-marriage-opponents-now-in-minority (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); Frank Newport, Religion Big Factor for Americans Against Same-Sex Marriage,
GALLUP POLITICS (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159089/religion-major-factor-americansopposed-sex-marriage.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing that fifty-three percent of those
polled supported same-sex marriage). Indeed, support of marriage equality is far greater than the public support
for interracial marriage was when the Supreme Court struck down anti-miscegenation laws. See Schacter, note
192, at 1155.
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Justice Kennedy’s conception of liberty might well include a constitutionally
protected right to intimate relationships that are treated with equal dignity. As
Professor Colucci puts it:
Given [Justice Kennedy’s] broad ideal of personal liberty, his willingness
to move beyond text and specific tradition . . . it is unlikely Kennedy
would accept traditional disapproval and continuing disapproval by a
majority alone as a sufficient state interest to override a law that
interferes with an individual’s free choice and development of his or her
203
own identity.
Justice Kennedy’s move to a liberty standard of inclusion rather than an equality
focus grounded on difference makes it plausible that relational dignity for all
204
could be the ticket to marriage equality.
VII. CONCLUSION
One so inclined can criticize the unorthodox constitutional analysis and the
uncertain reach of Justice Kennedy’s Romer and Lawrence opinions. Consistent
205
with Justice Kennedy’s cautious approach, these cases simply did not go
further than was necessary while strongly supporting the constitutional rights of
gays and lesbians.
Romer and Lawrence are foundational cases in the ongoing struggle for gay
206
and lesbian constitutional rights. Both cases, in often elegant and powerful
terms, go far in restoring the humanity to gay and lesbian citizens that Bowers
207
took from them. Justice Kennedy is acutely aware of how these decisions have
affected the lives of real people. I venture too that a person as empathetic,
thoughtful, and compassionate as Justice Kennedy is unsettled by the scorn and
contempt to which gays and lesbians are often subjected simply because of whom
they elect to love. In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy recognizes the importance of
the autonomy to make decisions regarding the formation of lasting and
meaningful relationships and fully connects ending sodomy laws with the
208
broader goal of human self-actualization. Following the logic of Lawrence, a
state would seemingly have a heavy burden to show a valid reason for depriving

203. COLUCCI, supra 5 note, at 22.
204. See id. at 23; see generally Yoshino, supra note 31.
205. See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 253 (1998); Cynthia Gorney, A Cautious
Conservatism; Judge Kennedy Lives by the Rules, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1987, at A1.
206. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
207. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Romer, 517 U.S. 620; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
208. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
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gay and lesbian people of the right to form lasting and loving bonds in the same
209
manner as their heterosexual counterparts.
Whether Justice Kennedy is ready to take the next step and join those
Justices who would find the heterosexual marriage monopoly of most states to be
unconstitutional is yet to be seen. Might he find that the concept of liberty
enshrined in the Due Process Clause extends so far? Surely, there is reason to
think that he will.
As Justice Kennedy so beautifully put it in Lawrence:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty
in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They
did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to
certain truth and that later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its own principles in
210
their own search for greater freedom.
In light of the long history of evolving attitudes about the meaning of
marriage, coupled with the Supreme Court’s clear support for marriage as a
211
212
fundamental right and its privacy jurisprudence, it is not hard to imagine that
the liberty interest enshrined in the Constitution would extend to the right of
adults to form lasting and meaningful bonds. For a state to deem some of those
relationships as lesser simply because of the sex of the participants requires some
significant justification extending beyond tradition, morality, and general
213
dislike.

209. See id. at 558.
210. Id. at 578–79. Professor Colucci contends that Justice Kennedy’s “‘ideal of liberty’ . . . considers
whether government actions have the effect of preventing an individual from developing his or her distinctive
personality or acting according to conscience, demean a person’s standing in the community, or violate essential
elements of human dignity.” COLUCCI, supra note 4, at 8–9. Similarly, Professor Knowles has noted that “the
humane element of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence . . . protects an individual’s ‘right to search for’ the dignity
that is central to his or her liberty.” KNOWLES, supra note 4, at 197. Surely, a right to equal access to marriage
could fall within the liberty ideal, and the search for dignity, as defined by Professors Colucci and Knowles.
211. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (“[I]nmate marriages, like others, are expressions of
emotional support and public commitment.”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“The right to
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974) (“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
212. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).
213. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010). Surely if the Court is prepared to see that intimate sexual conduct is a central
part of forming loving and meaningful bonds, providing equal access to the revered institution of marriage is an
even easier sell. Rather than an undercurrent of sex which permeates sodomy statutes, marriage is largely about
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The struggle for marriage equality will likely give Justice Kennedy the
opportunity to define the reach of the liberty interest as it applies to committed,
loving couples. And maybe the happy end of the story will indeed be “Liberty
214
and Justice for All.”

fidelity, commitment, and love.
214. FRANCIS BELLAMY, THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE (1892).
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